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Introduction 
 
There is no single conception of the subject in philosophy but a complex array of 
‘subjects’ satisfying different descriptions and roles in areas like metaphysics, ethics and 
epistemology (or theory of knowledge). However, it is possible to give some initial 
characterisations of the concepts of subjectivity most relevant to Derrida’s approach to 
philosophy.  
One key notion of the subject is that of a centre of psychological life; a ‘self’ 
which remains numerically identical ‘beneath’ or ‘behind’ one’s actions or experiences. 
For Descartes, the very act of thinking or experiencing implies the existence of a 
psychological subject, which he subsequently identifies with an immaterial mind. The act 
of ‘reflection’ (roughly, the monitoring one’s inner life) thus acquires an epistemic 
privilege famously exemplified in his foundational assertion that the act of thinking 
(cogito) presupposes the existence of the ‘I’ who thinks.  
In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant claims that this reflective ‘I think’ does not 
imply the existence of Cartesian mindstuff but is, rather, a ‘transcendental subject’, a 
condition of possibility for knowledge. For Kant, I can only represent the world as being 
a certain way if it is possible for me to be conscious of so representing it. The founder of 
modern phenomenology, Edmund Husserl – a philosopher who figures extensively in 
Derrida’s early work – asserts, likewise, that the transcendental subject is not in the world 
(like the psychological subject) but is the framework within which any world can be 
thought or experienced. For Husserl, like Descartes, the founding privilege of subjectivity 
derives from the subjective immediacy or ‘self-presence’ of mental states. He claims that 
every experience or thought has an intentional content by which it ‘refers’ to some object 
thought about or experienced. All that is relevant to the content of a thought, however, is 
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the manner in which its ‘intentional object’ is presented for the subject rather than the 
empirical existence or non-existence of that object. This self-presence supposedly affords 
an a priori framework in which philosophical questions about the nature of reality or the 
metaphysical status of certain kind of entity can be arbitrated independently of the truth 
or falsity of empirical claims in the natural or social sciences. 
As we shall see, Derrida’s work seeks to ‘deconstruct’ the idea of subjectivity as 
self-presence via two sets of interrelated arguments. The first involve time: Derrida 
denies that the temporal structure of experience is accessible from a first person point of 
view, thus throwing doubt on the metaphysical frameworks of Cartesianism and 
phenomenology. The second involve meaning or content: Derrida argues that signifying 
items are characterised by relationships or structures which deprive them of the stability 
or ‘self-identity’ that would enable them to be grasped by a reflecting subject. His 
commentator Rodolphe Gasché refers to these structures as ‘quasi-transcendentals’. As 
Gasché’s coinage implies, quasi-transcendentals are analogous to ‘conditions of 
possibility’ for knowledge or meaning posited in transcendental philosophy. They are 
also ‘conditions of impossibility’ because their recalcitrance to reflection deprives them 
of the privileged role assumed by subjectively accessible conditions.  
Quasi-transcendentals such as trace and différance are ‘phenomenologically-
derived’ but are not exclusive to the structure of human self-consciousness or awareness. 
This aspect of Derrida’s thought aligns him with modern philosophical naturalists who 
seek to explicate psychological or epistemic notions in terms which abstract from the 
supposed data of first-person mental life (The ‘functionalist’ proposal that psychological 
terms like ‘belief’ be defined in terms of causal roles within abstractly defined physical 
systems being a relevant point of comparison).  
However, while Derrida’s work deflates the epistemic primacy of the ‘first 
person’, it exhibits a concern with the continuity of philosophical concepts that is quite 
foreign to the spirit of contemporary naturalism. Thus in ‘Eating Well’ Derrida addresses 
the anti-subjectivism which has characterised much poststructuralist philosophy and 
Anglophone ‘theory’ with characteristic reserve (PTS 256). While conceding that 
thinkers like Foucault have transformed the role of the subject, he argues that these 
alterations testify to necessary possibility of its return - though the revenant need no 
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longer be recognisably ‘human’ as opposed to ‘animal’, or ‘alive’ as opposed to ‘non-
living’ (PTS 268-269).  The ‘classical’ conception of subjectivity deconstructed in 
Derrida’s work conforms to a certain ‘metaphysics of presence’ or epistemic proximity. It 
implies a boundary demarcating what is ‘proper’ and proximate to a subject (its mental 
states, its body, its meanings, etc.) and what inheres in ‘other’ subjects or non-subjective 
things.  Deconstruction contributes to a philosophical account of a non-classical subject 
whose ‘phenomenology’ is contingent upon and ‘open’ to historical or technical 
environments which are also its quasi-transcendental conditions. However, as we shall 
see below, the classical subject exerts a hold on Derrida’s thinking where he qualifies this 
contingency in the most radical manner: as a relation to an ‘other’ so transcendent that it 
resists conceptualisation through rational methods of belief-fixation. 
 
 
 The Phenomenological Subject  
 
Husserlian phenomenology seeks to clarify philosophical concepts by recovering their 
sources of meaning in intentional experiences. Derrida’s early works like Speech and 
Phenomena and Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry generally seize on some puported 
feature of phenomenological subjectivity to show that it can only fulfil this sense-
bestowing function if it exceeds phenomenological reflection in some way. Derrida 
attempts to show that phenomenology is afflicted by the very insecurity which Husserl 
hoped to resolve in areas like the foundations of mathematics, because its language is 
incapable of determining the field to which it applies (SP 10–12).  
The insecurity is exhibited most clearly in Husserl’s account of time-
consciousness. Its starting point is the transcendental assumption that the content of our 
experience of objective succession depends upon the organisation of subjective time. This 
would not be possible if each phase of my experience of (say) a melody were a ‘temporal 
atom’ intending only the present note. Somehow the successiveness of the notes must be 
given as well. Husserl explains this by analysing experience of the ‘now’ into three 
indissociable aspects: 1) an intending of the current phase of the object; 2) a ‘retention’ or 
primary remembrance of the previous experience; 3) a ‘protention’ anticipating the 
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experience to come. In retention, he claims, I ‘intuit’ the pastness of the past; living 
through the expired consciousness while the current impression is continuously modified 
by the upsurge of a new ‘now’.  
Derrida locates a tension between this continuist model and Husserl’s need to 
ensure fidelity to phenomenological fact. He claims that Husserl’s account implies two 
‘apparently irreconcilable possibilities’: a) that the temporal present is constituted in 
relation to an ‘non-phenomenologisable’ continuum in which retention just shades into 
ordinary recollection and b) that ‘the source of [phenomenological] certitude in general is 
the primordial character of the living now’ – thus distinguishing retention radically from 
the remembering of times not contiguous with the ‘now point’ in the temporal continuum 
(SP 67). The first possibility implies – against Husserl’s explicit intent – that the enabling 
structures of temporality must be phenomenologically inaccessible because the 
continuum is not a plausible candidate for intuitive consciousness. None of its ‘parts’ 
exist as a ‘self-identical’ object but each is constituted by relations in continuous flux (SP 
65–6). Thus the absence of another now cannot be accounted for in terms of the 
difference between a determinate ‘now point’ and a similarly self-identical past ‘now’ in 
retention – phenomenologically, they are equally indeterminable. Derrida proposes, 
instead, that we should account for the representability of conscious life in terms of the 
essential repetition implied by the ‘trace’ of a past that inflects each ‘instant’ of 
consciousness; a ‘bending back’ or fold ‘irreducible in presence or self-presence’ (SP 68, 
cf. OG 184). Whereas the content of Husserl’s retained past tracks the ‘now’ impression 
it modifies, the content of the trace – if it is permissible to speak in these terms – is 
constrained by ‘the movement of repetition’ or by relations within a ‘general text’ or 
‘weave’ of traces in which there is no stabilising centre such as Husserl’s notional 
present. 
 
Scriptural Subjectivity  
 
Any analogy between phenomenological time and the trace structure is thus, for Derrida, 
both provisional and inadequate (SP 68, M 13). Like all quasi-transcendentals, ‘trace’ is 
‘topic neutral’. It does not qualify the structure of retention more than, for example, it 
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characterises the structure of signification. Thus Derrida also describes the system of 
traces as a ‘generalised writing’ – a trope drawing on writing’s ambiguous status as an 
external technical medium which insinuates itself in subjective life by emancipating 
meaning from local contexts of interpretation. Following Husserl’s lead, Derrida sees the 
technicization of thought wrought by graphic inscription as a condition of historical 
conceptions of science as a transcultural search for objectivity or axiomatic completeness 
(EHG 87). However, generalised writing – or the system of traces – is not limited to the 
empirical activity of writing but is ‘the essence and the content of these activities 
themselves’ (OG 9). 
 Derrida holds that linguistic signs exemplify the trace-structure because their 
meaning depends on contrastive relationships within linguistic systems (a position he 
derives initially from Saussurean linguistics but which is arguably developed with greater 
logical resource in the work of Quine and Davidson). However, he importantly qualifies 
this ‘holism’, claiming that this interdependence deprives systems of any closure or 
finality. There is no referent or ‘transcendental signified’ which removes the dependence 
of signs upon other signs, or, as Husserl would say, ‘fulfils’ a signifying intention in the 
thing or state of affairs intended. The experience of a thing, for Derrida, is thus already a 
‘sign’ or text or a ‘grapheme’ (in the generalised sense) in so far as its content depends 
upon a temporal, cognitive and linguistic context that is ‘always on the move’ (OG 49).  
 The subject of thought, experience and intentionality is, accordingly, an ‘effect’ of 
a mobile network of signifying states structurally open to modification or 
recontextualisation. Différance captures this essential openness by capitalising on the 
homonymy between the French verbs for differing and deferring.  The identity or stability 
of the system of traces is differed-deferred because ‘vitiated by the mark of its relation to 
the future element’ (M 13–17). This bares comparison, once again, with Husserl’s 
concept of protention, but it is not a subjective anticipation or synthesis.  
 
Materialism and Naturalism 
 
The affiliation between deconstruction and a philosophical naturalism inspired by work 
in contemporary biology, artificial intelligence and cognitive science is acknowledged in 
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Derrida’s frequent discussions of ‘cybernetics’, computing, and technologies whereby 
experience is ‘archived’ in scriptural or digital media (See OG 9, 47, WD 228, AF). This 
‘materialist’ tendency in Derridean thought is exemplified early on in ‘Freud and the 
Scene of Writing’ where the phenomenologically-derived notion of ‘trace’ is applied to a 
reading of Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology.  
In the Project Freud sought to apply late nineteenth century discoveries 
concerning the structure and function of nervous tissue to a model of the physical 
realisation of mental functions. The explanatory ‘atom’ of Freud’s model is the 
‘neurone’, a nerve cell that can transmit or receive quantities of excitation (Qn). Freud’s 
account of psychological function confronts the problem of how a system composed of 
interconnected populations of neurones can be receptive to novel stimulations 
(perceptions) and retain the influence of past excitations – that is, exercise the function of 
memory. Memory is accounted for by what is now referred to as the ‘Hebb rule’ in 
theories of neural networks. Freud proposed that the resistance exhibited by pathways 
through a special system of ‘psychic’ or  neurones would be reduced by the passage of 
Qn (  neurones resist because they are protected by a sheath of perceptual neurones, thus 
receiving lower doses of stimulation). The ‘memory’ of past stimulations is represented 
by the lower resistances associated with frequently stimulated pathways.  
For Derrida, the significance of Freud’s account of memory lies less in its 
neurological plausibility than in the way it both applies and ‘displaces’ a model of mental 
representation as a kind of ‘brain writing’ whose inscriptions are unproblematically 
present or absent like marks on a white sheet. The scriptural metaphor is warranted in so 
far as memory is ‘incised’ by the ‘breaching’ of paths through the  system. However, as 
Derrida points out, it is impossible to identify the memory trace with a particular pathway 
or passage since memory just is differences: ‘an equality of resistance to breaching, or an 
equivalence of the breaching forces, would eliminate any preference in the choice of 
itinerary. Memory would be paralysed. It is the difference between breaches which is the 
true origin of memory, and thus of psyche’ (WD 201). In the first instance, then, memory 
is not represented by absolute quantities in the neural system but – as with the Saussurean 
sign – by a differential text.  
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As before, these differences are deferred rather than constituting a closed system. 
The memory trace cannot correspond to a particular ensemble of such differences 
because its function requires a re-breaching and thus a change in both absolute and 
relative resistance. Thus there is no original mnemic-inscription that could be stored and 
self-identically repeated in recollection: ‘[Repetition] does not happen to an original 
impression; its possibility is already there, in the resistance offered the first time by the 
psychical neurones. Resistance itself is possible only if the opposition of forces lasts and 
is repeated at the beginning. It is the very idea of a first time which becomes enigmatic’ 
(WD 202). Thus as Daniel Dennett has recently suggested with regard to the neural 
correlates of conscious experience, it is always an ‘open question’ what the psycho-
neural trace ‘signifies’; its essence or content depends on how it is subsequently deployed 
within the system.  
 
 Technics  
 
Derrida’s use of scriptural idioms to displace the subject does not disavow the need for 
mental or extra-mental agencies to implement the functions of the psyche. However, by 
emphasising the non-local, differential character of the trace, Derrida allows us to think 
of these ‘writing machines’ as distributed and inter-connected in a manner irreducible to 
the time of phenomenology: ‘The “subject” of writing does not exist if we mean by that 
some sovereign solitude of the author. The subject of writing is a system of relations 
between strata: . . . the psyche, society, the world. Within that scene, on that stage, the 
punctual simplicity of the classical subject is not to be found’ (WD 226-7). 
Accordingly, we can no longer think of public media of expression as expressing 
(more or less inadequately) an inner life whose intrinsic character would be unaffected by 
social texts. The trace is intrinsically extrinsic: a function of the way in which it is 
repeated or re-deployed. The importance of repetition is brought out in Derrida’s reading 
of J L Austin’s How to do Things with Words, where he argues that for a sign to function 
in normal or ‘serious’ contexts it must be transferable or ‘iterable’ into ‘deviant’ contexts, 
altering its semantic or performative value (LI 12). Iteration is not the repetition of some 
self-identical attribute, however, because there is nothing to a sign beyond rules 
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determining that some mark is a token of a given (semantic, syntactic or performative) 
type. However a sign being iterable means that its deviant occurrences (the ones that 
‘break’ the rules) are essential to its ‘proper’ or serious uses. There can thus be no pure 
form or meaning corresponding to the essence of the sign – a principle that Derrida 
extends to all contentful states such as pictorial inscriptions or experiences (LI 10).  
The principle of iterability can be seen as undermining the very possibility of the 
subject as conceived in modern epistemology or ethical theory. However, Derrida re-
conceptualises the subject as an ‘assemblage’ of texts/agencies with no principled 
boundary. For example, Derrida argues that a distinctly modern form of subjectivity – the 
authorship and experience of ‘literature’ – is predicated on technologies and practices 
which, as in the Freudian psyche, both ‘censor’ and enable the dissemination of texts. 
Thus while Kafka’s parable ‘Before the Law’ is typographically identical to a passage in 
the penultimate chapter of The Trial, the former is a distinct ‘work’ with a kind of legal 
personhood: ‘If someone were to change one word or alter a single sentence, a judge 
could always declare him or her to have infringed upon, violated, or disfigured the text’ 
(AL 211). The ‘singularity’ of the work is regulated by conventions which constitute our 
experience of a unique literary object. These might be thought of as mere adjuncts to the 
work – much as Kant regarded parerga such as picture frames or the draperies on statues. 
However, the ‘literariness’ of the work is constituted by its legal status. The border of the 
ergon (work) depends on its ‘outside’ (parergon). By the same token, framing always 
involves the disposition and control of iterable marks or ‘traits’ which can be iterated in 
ways that transform the framing/forming of works: ‘The frame is essentially constructed 
and therefore fragile: such would be the essence or truth of the frame. If it had any’ (TP 
73, cf. AF 25–28). New scriptural technologies such as the Internet may subvert the 
modern institution of copyright – introduced, after all, to regulate printed matter – by 
allowing unregulated distribution and re-grafting of texts. Since the character and content 
of experience is determined by its modes of repetition, storage or framing, ‘what is no 
longer archived in the same way is no longer lived in the same way’ (AF 18).  
For Derrida experience is technically modifiable through its modes of 
reproduction because it already has the iterative structure of generalised writing. This 
position has the virtue of removing certain obstacles to thinking about the subject 
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naturalistically. By distributing and externalising the functions of the subject, it implies 
that subjectivity is too dependent on the world to be the constitutive ‘origin’ of it (as in 
Husserl) and thus is more easily seen as amenable to causal-scientific explanation. In this 
sense, at least, the quasi-transcendental must be rigorously distinguished from the 
transcendental. However, while Derrida is deflationary in this regard, he has consistently 
affiliated himself with thinkers who – like Levinas and Heidegger – seek to address 
conditions of thought or experience that are radically indescribable within any ontology 
or scientific metaphysics. Différance and the other quasi-transcendentals are sometimes 
viewed as ‘pre-ontological’ in this sense.  
 
Alterity or Otherwise? 
 
In his recent work, Derrida has been especially concerned to show that there are pre-
ontological conditions of thought that are ‘ethical’, testifying to an encounter with an 
‘other’ whose nature is indeterminable in principle. This ‘alterity’ can be seen as 
consequent upon the lack of any final context within which competing principles of 
judgement can be arbitrated. Iterability implies, as we have seen, that the text is both 
context-bound and transcends any given context, supposing ‘both that there are only 
contexts, that nothing exists outside context . . . but also that the limit of the frame or the 
border of the context always entails a clause of nonclosure. The outside penetrates and 
thus determines the inside’ (LI 152). Thinking, acting, judging, etc., are thus always and 
essentially ‘precipitate’ or ahead of themselves – not because there are no rules but 
because rules have no existence beyond their instances in which they are applied and the 
contexts regulating these applications (See ‘Force of Law’ in DPJ and AR). Any 
application of a rule – is thus potentially also an act of reinterpretation or invention: 
‘Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique 
interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely’ (AR 
251).  
There is a deliberate conflation of the normative and the descriptive in this ‘can or 
ought’. One cannot not be precipitate but here – where the case of legal decision is being 
considered – one should in acting, modify or re-institute the context or ‘frame’. For 
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Derrida the principle underlying this ‘ought’ is not, as in Kant, determinable by reason 
and thus replaces the principle of autonomy – according to which the responsible subject 
must be the sole author of its action – with a principle of ‘heteronomy’. Responsibility is 
‘excessive’ and thus undermines the subject as ‘a principle of calculatibility’ – even if, 
Derrida cautions, calculation is also an absolute moral and political necessity (PTS 272, 
cf. OCF).  
In these ethical ruminations Derrida consistently leans on Levinas’ conception of 
subjectivity as a kind of ‘hostage’ persecuted by an alterity which – as in the logic of the 
trace – always precedes any act of consciousness or identification. This occasionally 
leads to the inflation of indeterminability to the status of a quasi-mystical transcendence. 
But it should not be forgotten that Derrida has criticised the Levinasian notion that the 
other should also be seen as transcending our epistemological capacities (WD 126, see 
‘LEVINAS’). Here it is important to bear in mind that a language of absolute ‘alterity’ or 
otherness finds its place within the framework of transcendental philosophy where the 
subject, or some equivalent notion like ‘Language’ or Heidegger’s Dasein (which Derrida 
describes as analogous to a transcendental subject [PTS 273]) still operates as an 
organising principle. It is, arguably, only within the ‘super-context’ of some such 
constitutive framework that we can intelligibly speak of an ‘other’ which transcends it. 
Thus it remains unclear whether the core arguments developed in Derrida’s work on 
language, mental representation or transcendental subjectivity can ever licence the 
rhetoric of ‘radical transcendence’.  
 
Major Texts on the Subject 
 
Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, 1978 (EHG) 
Speech and Phenomena, 1973 (SP) 
 
Following the prospectus of Husserl’s late essay ‘The Origin of Geometry’, EHG argues 
that phenomenology cannot restrict itself to a ‘static’ description of intentional 
experiences but must also consider the role of language and technology in constituting 
ideal meanings. SP problematises Husserl’s attempt to isolate a pure subjective sphere of 
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expression untainted by any involvement with the pragmatic or associative dimensions of 
language. 
 
Related material: 
‘“Genesis and Structure” and Phenomenology’ 
‘Form and Meaning’  
 
Writing and Difference (Inc. ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, ‘Cogito and the History of 
Madness’, ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, ‘“Genesis and Structure” and Phenomenology’), 
1978 (WD). 
 
‘Cogito’ criticises Foucault’s history of the Enlightenment exclusion and medicalisation 
of madness. Derrida argues that Foucault’s invocation of madness as the ‘other’ of reason 
take insufficient account of reason’s capacity to transcend historical structures – as 
exemplified in Descartes’ use of ‘hyperbolic’ doubt in Meditation I.  
 
Of Grammatology, 1976 (OG). 
 
Margins of Philosophy (inc. ‘Différance’, ‘Signature Event Context’, ‘The Ends of Man’, 
‘White Mythology’, ‘Form and Meaning’), 1982 (M).  
 
‘Différance’ is a synoptic piece exploring the interweaving of différance in a range of 
subjectivist and anti-subjectivist philosophies. ‘Signature’ articulates Derrida’s single 
best idea – ‘iterability’ – and is crucial for understanding the interplay between 
subjectivity, writing, social practices and institutions addressed in later work.  
 
The Truth in Painting (inc. ‘Parergon’), 1987 (TP). 
 
‘Parergon’ explores the peculiar logic of the frame or ‘parergonality’ in a reading of 
Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’. As suggested above, we can think of framing practices 
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and technologies as, in various ways, externalising the formative function of the 
imagination. 
 
Related material: 
‘The Purveyor of Truth’ 
‘Before the Law’ 
 
The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, (inc. Le facteur de la vérité, [The 
Purveyor of Truth], ‘To Speculate - on “Freud”’), 1987 (PC). 
 
‘Purveyor’ is a critical reading of Lacan’s seminar on Poe’s ‘The Purloined Letter’. 
Derrida criticizes Lacan for reading the letter in Poe’s story as signifying the ‘truth’ of 
female sexuality as castration. ‘To Speculate’ develops some themes of ‘Freud and the 
Scene of Writing’, notably the way the structural delay at the origin of the secondary 
process accounts for the functional non-specificity of ‘pleasure’ in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. It also examines the role of autobiographical speech acts in inaugurating the 
‘scientificity’ of psychoanalysis. 
 
Related Material: 
‘Otobiographies’ in The Ear of the Other, 1985 (EO). 
‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ 
EHG 
 
Of Spirit, 1987 (OP) 
 
Among the broader themes covered here are Heidegger’s discussion of the animal and 
later claims that the hermeneutics of Being requires a pre-ontological ‘event’ of 
affirmation or ‘pledging’. 
 
Related Material: 
‘Ulysses Gramophone’ 
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‘Eating Well’ 
‘Force of Law’ 
 
Limited Inc, (inc. ‘Signature Event Context’, ‘Limited Inc a b c . . .’, ‘Afterword: 
Towards an Ethic of Discussion’), LI (1988).  
 
Points: interviews 1974-1994 (inc. ‘Eating Well: or the calculation of the subject’), 1995 
(PTS) 
‘Eating Well’ provides useful and largely accessible introduction to Derrida’s views on 
the subject.  
 
Acts of Literature (inc. ‘Before the Law’, ‘Ulysses Gramophone: Here Say Yes in Joyce’, 
‘The Law of Genre’), 1992 (AL). 
 
‘Before the Law’ is a reading of Kafka’s parable ‘Before the Law’. It lucidly addresses 
the constitutive effects of framing and the function of authorship. Worth comparing to 
Foucault’s ‘What is an Author?’.  
 
Acts of Religion (inc. ‘Force of Law’, ‘Hostipitality’), 2002 (AR).  
 
Archive Fever, 1995 (AF). 
This book takes up the themes of archiving, inscription and the technically mediated 
character of subjectivity and links them to the notion of messianic time.  
 
Related Material: 
‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ 
‘To Speculate - on “Freud”’ 
Spectres of Marx 
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